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EGYPT AND THE MIDDLE EAST: 
DEMOCRACY, ANTI-DEMOCRACY AND PRAGMATIC FAITH1 
MATTHEW CRIPPEN* 
ABSTRACT 
In this article, I discuss prospects for democracy in the Middle East. I argue, 
first, that some democratic experiments—for instance, Egypt under 
Mohammed Morsi—are not in keeping with etymological and historical 
meanings of democracy; and second, that efforts to promote democracy, 
especially as exemplified in U.N. documents emphasizing universal rights 
grounded in Western traditions, are possibly totalitarian and also colonialist 
and hence counter to democratic ideals insofar as they impart one set of values 
as the only morally acceptable ones. A respectful dialogue in which people 
from both regions strive to understand conditions giving rise to certain social 
practices would be more productive than morally superior attitudes, and help 
all to see areas where their respective cultures could be improved. I conclude 
by discussing concepts of democratic and pragmatic faith articulated by John 
Dewey and William James, arguing that democracy will continue to flounder 
in the Middle East so long as the basic trust implied in these concepts is 
lacking; and how Westerners might consider this a cautionary tale regarding 
social attitudes and public policies contrary to democratic life in their own 
countries. 
 
 1. I would like to acknowledge the work of my graduate assistant, Hagar el-Houdaiby, who 
has a background in both philosophy and law. She went through numerous international 
documents, highlighting key portions and supplying some analysis, while also pointing me to a 
number of valuable secondary sources. 
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also media, politics, Wittgenstein, the Frankfurt School, Dewey, James, Thoreau, Nietzsche, 
history of science, religious faith, freewill, Greek philosophy and more. While diverse, his work 
unites around “ecological” approaches that place objects of investigation in world-contexts. 
Matthew has been pleased to teach an international population of students first at York University 
in Toronto, and now at the American University in Cairo, where he is an assistant professor. 
Outside of the academy, he has worked as a musician, mandolin and guitar teacher and 
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INTRODUCTION 
In what follows, I focus on prospects for democracy in Egypt and the 
Middle East, pursuing two interrelated points. First, I suggest what the West 
lauded as Egypt’s first democratic government under Mohamed Morsi was not 
keeping with etymological, historical and indeed U.N. conceptions of 
democracy. Accordingly, the experiment did not fail, as the Western media 
overwhelmingly suggested; it fizzled soon after the election because 
democracy never really happened in the first place. Second, I argue that many 
international projects promoting democracy, especially as exemplified in U.N. 
documents, tacitly extol Western values as the only morally acceptable ones. 
Insofar as this more or less subjugates the totality to a single order favoring 
Western ideology, it is arguably totalitarian and colonialist and consequently 
counter to democratic ideals. Throughout I suggest that Middle Eastern 
countries face realities foreign to the West, and it is wrongheaded to presume 
that straightforwardly Western systems will inevitably work there if the aim is 
to promote human wellbeing. 
While generally skeptical of Western attempts to export democracy, partly 
because concepts of democracy in the West are already impoverished, and also 
because “freedom” and “oppression” are often shallowly conceived, I finish by 
discussing prospects for democracy in the Middle East. Current conditions in 
the Middle East are bleak, with many justifiably afraid to speak out, intervene 
and engage in oppositional discourse. This is not only contrary to the 
establishment of democratic government, but to having what the pragmatic 
philosopher John Dewey, among others, characterized as democratic life. To 
the extent that conditions prevent the latter from flourishing, the former will 
flounder too. 
Open and respectful discourse is key to democratic life. Yet by and large, 
critiques of the Middle East and its largely Islamic culture have the air of one 
party taking a morally superior stance over another without adequately 
pondering the specific situation of the other. The West and Middle East would 
benefit from a respectful dialogue, which would enable people in both regions 
to better see flaws in their respective cultures. This relates to another concept 
discussed by Dewey, namely, “democratic faith.”2 Elaborating on this concept 
with help from William James and his pragmatic understanding of faith, I 
argue that prospects in the Middle East are currently poor because the basic 
trust that democracy requires and entails is largely lacking. For such reasons it 
may also be threatened in Western countries as well. 
 
 2. See generally John Dewey, The Democratic Faith and Education, 4 THE ANTIOCH REV. 
274 (1944). 
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SHALLOW DEMOCRACY 
I arrived in Egypt at the beginning of what came to be known as the 
“January Revolution,” and witnessed the mass protests in Tahrir that 
contributed to the removal of the military dictator Hosni Mubarak. Hope in 
Egypt and abroad was high, with Barack Obama, if a billboard at Cairo 
International Airport is to be trusted, declaring: “We must educate our children 
to become like young Egyptian people.”3 However, optimism dwindled for 
those specifically opposing military governments, for the army was still 
governing as it had since the time of Gamal Nasser. Moreover, living 
conditions remained essentially unchanged and in fact worsened to the extent 
that tourism—one of the most important sectors in Egypt—nearly collapsed. 
Roughly a year-and-half after the January uprising, Egypt had a run-off 
vote to determine who would be president. Even though this was lauded as 
Egypt’s first free presidential election, with voter turnout barely above 50%, 
many were less than enthusiastic and it was not hard to see why.4 One choice 
was Ahmed Shafik, a retired air marshal and last Prime Minister under 
Mubarak and therefore a representative of the old guard. The other was the 
Islamist candidate Mohammed Morsi, a second-choice substitute for Khairat 
el-Shater, who was disqualified because of past convictions—possibly and 
perhaps likely politically motivated—for terrorism and money laundering. 
Morsi went on to win by a narrow margin.5 
Things did not appreciably improve. Aside from economic problems that 
were not really the fault of the government, Morsi, as an article from The 
Economist put it somewhat hyperbolically, “did his best to flout the norms of 
democracy during his short stint as president.”6 He commenced his term with 
an act of quasi-fraud since the Brotherhood had promised not to run a 
presidential candidate, and Morsi merely resigned from the party that had 
heavily financed his campaign a few days before swearing into office. Then, in 
the fall of 2013, Morsi decreed absolute power on himself and declared himself 
above the law, with some claiming he did so because Mubarak and military 
loyalists were interfering with the judiciary and political system. He pushed a 
new constitution to a vote with only a few weeks’ notice and therefore little 
 
 3. Mohamed El-Bendary attributes this to remarks Obama made the day Mubarak resigned. 
See MOHAMED EL-BENDARY, THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION: BETWEEN HOPE AND 
DESPAIR: MUBARAK TO MORSI 11 (2013). 
 4. See Voter turnout data for Egypt, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL 
ASSISTANT, http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=69 (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). 
 5. See David K. Kirkpatrick, Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-mus 
lim-brotherhood-declared-as-egypts-president.html?_r=0. 
 6. The Arab Spring: Has it Failed?, THE ECONOMIST (July 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21581734-despite-chaos-blood-and-democratic-
setbacks-long-process-do-not-give-up. 
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chance of informed and hence empowered consent. During the same period, 
his backing party, The Muslim Brotherhood, objected to an U.N. bill because, 
among other things, it would designate spousal sexual assault of women—
currently legal in most Middle Eastern countries—as rape, while also giving 
equal rights to homosexuals and children born out of wedlock.7 Free 
expression was stifled on even trivial matters, with the exceptionally popular 
satirist Bassem Youssef investigated for maligning Morsi and later charged for 
insulting Islam.8 Furthermore, Morsi and his backing party were mostly silent 
and indeed encouraging in Arabic posts of violent mobs outside the U.S. 
embassy,9 and his supporters vandalized the property of minority Copts and 
murdered them en masse in the aftermath of his ousting.10 In short, Morsi, 
along with many of his supporters, “reverted to the same undemocratic policies 
that he was elected to change. In effect, Morsi simply replaced a secular 
autocratic rule with an Islamist one.”11 Consequently a year after Morsi’s 
election, mass protests erupted, fueled in subtle and not so subtle ways by the 
military. Morsi and his government fell. The army, which had never really 
relinquished power, took over again, with Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the man who 
led the military coup, later popularly elected President. 
 
 7. Muslim Brotherhood Statement Denouncing UN Women Declaration for Violating 
Sharia Principles, IKHANWEB (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30 
731. 
 8. Egypt authorities to investigate popular satirist Bassem Youssef, Aljazeera (Oct. 28, 
2013), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/29/egypt-authoritiestoinvestigatetopsatirist 
bassemyoussef.html. 
 9. The Brotherhood’s Arabic Twitter feed read: “Egyptians rise up to support Muhammad 
in front of the American Embassy. Sept. 11.” Morsi was also silent about violence until receiving 
a “blunt” phone call from President Barack Obama. See David D. Kirkpatrick et al., Egypt, 
Hearing From Obama, Moves to Heal Rift From Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 13, 2012), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/world/middleeast/egypt-hearing-from-obama-moves-to-
heal-rift-from-protests.html?_r=0; see also Ian Black, Mohamed Morsi: A Spectacular Balancing 
Act, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 16, 2012, 7:09 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2012/ 
sep/16/profile-mohamed-morsi; Robert Kagan, The Proper U.S. Response to Cairo Embassy 
Attack, WASH. POST (Sep. 13, 2012), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rob 
ert-kagan-the-proper-us-response-to-cairo-embassy-attack/2012/09/13/64aee4ac-fdb1-11e1-b153-
218509a954e1_story.html. 
 10. See e.g., Egypt: Islamists Hit Christian Churches, CBS NEWS (Aug. 17, 2013, 9:28 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egypt-islamists-hit-christian-churches/; Mail Foreign Service, 
Islamist Mob Parades Nuns in Cairo as Prisoners of War After Six Hours Looting Church School 
and Replacing Cross with Banner Resembling Al Qaeda Flag, THE DAILY MAIL (Aug. 18, 2013, 
5:29 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2396764/Egypt-crisis-Islamist-mob-parades 
nuns-Cairo-prisoners-war.html. 
 11. Noah Beck, Morsi’s Demise Good News for Egyptian Democracy, THE COMMENTATOR, 
(July 8, 2013, 9:33), http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3929/morsi_s_demise_good_news_ 
for_egyptian_democracy. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] EGYPT AND THE MIDDLE EAST 285 
Many have of course argued that the removal of Morsi was undemocratic 
on the grounds that it was achieved through a coup. As I will soon point out, 
however, democracy is not reducible to voting, and voting can be put to 
undemocratic purposes. Moreover, governments that most—even if naively—
identify as “democratic” have been established through force, as with the 
American Revolution and also that of Portugal in 1971. Yet while I reject 
arguments that the actual removal was necessarily undemocratic by virtue of 
occurring through a coup, the level of oppression in Egypt is arguably worse 
today than it was even under Mubarak. 
Some are afraid to talk openly on the telephone or in public. In one 
prominent example, shortly after the Morsi overthrow, young women 
peacefully and non-disruptively protesting with signs were sentenced to 11 
years in prison, with the punishment later reduced.12 Then there were also the 
mass killings of pro-Morsi protestors, and while some were armed and violent, 
such a massacre cannot be justified by any standard morality.13 Secret arrests 
also seem on the rise.14 So too are politically motivated cases of harassment, 
with a number of individuals in my personal circle effected. Recently one 
friend, the former Libyan Ambassador Mohammed Fayez Jibril and longtime 
Cairo resident, was attacked with others in his embassy by Egyptian thugs 
wielding chains and other weapons on the grounds that he was a Brotherhood 
sympathizer, a claim incidentally false.15 An ex-student who supports LTGB 
rights has received threats from police. Ismail Alexandrani, respected 
journalist, researcher and husband of another ex-student, has been jailed for 
speaking against the Egyptian Military at an academic conference in 
Germany.16 The pretext for detaining him is once again that he is a 
 
 12. Gregg Carlstrom, Convicted Egyptian women eye new protests, Aljazeera (Dec. 11, 
2013, 9:06), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/arrested-egyptian-women-demon 
strating-again-20131210122543688647.html; Tony Gamal Gabriel & El-Sayed Gamal Eddin, 
Severe sentences for Alexandria female protesters spark Egypt outcry, AHRAMONLINE (Nov. 28, 
2013) http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/87715/Egypt/Politics-/Severe-sentences-for-
Alexandria-female-protesters-.aspx. 
 13. David D. Kirkpatrick, Hundreds Die as Egyptian Forces Attack Islamist Protestors, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/world/middleeast/egypt.html? 
_r=0. 
 14. See e.g., Egypt: Dozens Detained Secretly: National Security Officers Operating Outside 
the Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (July 20, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/20/egypt-
dozens-detained-secretly; Ayah Aman, Egyptians Left in Dark about Secret Abduction Cases, 
AL-MONITOR (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/egypt-forced-
abduction-arrest-campaigns-police.html. 
 15. I have been acquainted with the family of the former Ambassador since the fall of 2011, 
and they have long expressed reservations about the Brotherhood, even when it was not in vogue 
to do so. 
 16. See, e.g., Egypt Journalist Arrested for his Work, AMNESTY INT’L (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde12/2997/2015/en/; Egypt: Journalist Unlawfully 
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Brotherhood supporter in spite of him having publically criticized the group. 
Apathy among voters is even higher now than for the elections that brought 
Morsi and his party to power, with a turnout of less than 30% for the 
parliamentary elections of the fall of 2015.17 Many simply feel their vote 
makes no difference,18 a belief fueled in part by the near absence of viable 
opposition. 
It should accordingly be clear—even under a relatively shallow 
understanding—that Egypt has never had a democratic government. Only this 
is not clear. Many of course accept that the government of Sisi is 
undemocratic, along with earlier military and monarchical regimes. But the 
overwhelming sentiment among Western media and politicians, with some 
exceptions, was that Morsi was popularly elected and, consequently, that his 
overthrow was by definition anti-democratic.19 However, supposing even the 
majority of Egyptians voted for Morsi and supported the sometimes violent 
actions of his party—which they did not20—it would still not follow that they 
 
Arrested, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/01/egypt-
journalist-unlawfully-arrested; Anealla Safdar, Egypt Extends Journalist’s Detention by 15 Days, 
ALJAZEERA (Dec. 1, 2015, 10:19 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/award-winning-
egyptian-reporter-held-unknown-charges-151130182357719.html; Editorial, Egypt’s State of 
Repression, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-state-
of-repression/2015/12/03/6fbf98dc-991c-11e5-8917-653b65c809eb_story.html. 
 17. See Agence France-Presse, Low Turnout as Egyptians Shun Elections Designed to Shore 
up Sisi, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2015, 9:26 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world 2015/oct/ 
18/egypt-parliamentary-elections-shore-up-sisi. 
 18. See Agence France-Presse, Low Turnout as Egyptians Shun Elections Designed to Shore 
up Sisi, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2015, 9:26 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/ 
18/egypt-parliamentary-elections-shore-up-sisi; Hatem Maher, Egypt’s parliamentary elections: 
‘Who cares’?, AHRAM ONLINE (Oct. 18, 2015), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/164/ 
155944/Egypt/Egypt-Elections-/Egypts-parliamentary-elections-Who-cares.aspx. 
 19. See generally Matthew Crippen, Asleep at the Press: Thoreau, Egyptian Revolt and 
Nuances of Democracy, 20 ARAB MEDIA & SOC’Y 1 (Winter 2015) (summarizing media 
reactions); see also, e.g., Editorial, Crisis in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/opinion/crisis-in-egypt.html (demonstrating typical 
examples); Op-Ed, Egypt’s Military Coup Casts Shadow over Democratic Revolution: Editorial, 
THE TORONTO STAR (July 4, 2013), http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/2013/07/04/egypts 
_military_coup_casts_shadow_over_democratic_revolution_editorial.html; Fawaz Gerges, Egypt 
Coup: The Military Has not just Ousted Morsi. It Has Ousted Democracy, THE GUARDIAN (July 
4, 2013, 1:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/04/egypt-coup-military-
morsi-democracy. 
 20. For example, a 2011 Gallup document states that while “richer countries in general are 
more likely than those in poorer countries to reject individual attacks on civilians,” Egypt violates 
this trend and “ties Finland as the country with the highest level of unequivocal rejection of 
individual attacks against civilians. Furthermore, Egypt ranks as one of the top countries in the 
world for rejecting military attacks against civilians.” Views of Violence, GALLUP (2011), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/157067/views-violence.aspx. Even at the height of their power, 
moreover, support for the Brotherhood was not emphatic. In the election for the People’s 
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were democratic, anymore than it would if the majority in a society voted to 
enslave a minority. This is to say, effective democracy cannot be reduced to 
voting, yet many Western politicians and reporters suggested otherwise when 
they lamented that the ousting had overthrown Egypt’s first democratic 
president. 
The Western reaction to the election and subsequent overthrow of Morsi is 
illustrative because it exemplifies how impoverished common conceptions of 
democracy are. Etymologically “democracy”—from the Greek words dēmos 
for “people” and kratia for “power or rule”—means empowering people.21 This 
is what people have historically hoped to achieve when fighting for 
democracy. While electoral processes have been a means to this goal, voting, 
as just explained, can be put to undemocratic uses if it arbitrarily and 
systematically disenfranchises segments of society, as is the case when gay 
marriage is quashed by popular referendums. 
Voting accordingly can lead to what Alex de Tocqueville and later Henry 
David Thoreau called a “tyranny of the majority.” Though an admirer of 
American democracy, Tocqueville observed: 
What I most reproach in democratic government … is not, as many people in 
Europe claim, its weakness but on the contrary, its irresistible force. And what 
is repugnant to me … is the lack of guarantee against tyranny. 
Public opinion? that is what forms the majority; the legislative body? it 
represents the majority and obeys blindly; the executive power? it is named by 
the majority and serves as its passive instrument; the public forces? the public 
forces are nothing other than the majority in arms; the jury? the jury is the 
majority vested with the right to pronounce decrees: in certain states, the 
judges themselves are elected by the majority.22 
Or, as Thoreau complained, “the practical reason why ... a majority are 
permitted, and for a long period continue, to rule, is not because they are most 
likely to be in the right, nor because this seems fairest to the minority, but 
 
Assembly, the Brotherhood garnered 37.5% of the vote with a turnout of 52%. In the election of 
the Upper House (Shura Council) they won 58% of seats, but with 45% of votes cast, and a 
turnout of only 10%. In the final runoff of presidential elections, Morsi won 51.7% of the popular 
vote, with a turnout of 52%, but even this does not indicate emphatic support since the alternative 
was Ahmed Shafik, the last Prime Minister under the dictator Hosni Mubarak, and therefore a 
representative of the just ousted autocratic regime. Nicholas Wade, Egypt: What Poll Results 
Reveal about Brotherhood’s Popularity, BBC (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-23846680. 
 21. Democracy definition, THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENG. ETYMOLOGY (T. F. 
Hoad ed., 2003). 
 22. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 241 (Harvey C. Mansfield & 
Delba Winthrop ed., trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835). 
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because they are physically the strongest.”23 Without denying the majority is 
ever correct, he held that “a government in which the majority rule in all cases 
cannot be based on justice,”24 thereby making the obvious point that voting 
does not guarantee moral rightness. While perhaps underestimating the role of 
checks and balances and limiting effects of constitutional law, these analyses 
point to how reducing systems to mere voting can disempower minorities or 
individuals on arbitrary and morally questionable grounds. In effect, therefore, 
such systems can have anti-democratic consequences. 
Although U.N. documents are not without problems, a point taken up later, 
they at least recognize a potential for a tyranny of the majority, as do many 
constitutions and charters. So while The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights declares, “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government,”25 it also limits what the majority can decree by adding: 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law.26 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.27 
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.28 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.29 
None of these strictures necessarily has anything to do with voting. Yet if 
followed, they clearly limit the capacity of a majority to tyrannize a minority 
or individual through electoral processes. 
The pattern is the same in the U.N.’s International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.30 It states that people shall have “the right to vote and to be 
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of 
 
 23. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849), in COLLECTED ESSAYS AND 
POEMS 203, 204 (Elizabeth H. Witherell ed., 2001). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(II), at Art. 21 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 26. G.A. Res. 217 (III), supra note 25, at Art. 7. 
 27. G.A. Res. 217 (III), supra note 25, at Art. 18. 
 28. G.A. Res. 217 (III), supra note 25, at Art. 20. 
 29. G.A. Res. 217 (III), supra note 25, at Art. 19. 
 30. See Generally, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 
(XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
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the will of the electors”; and further that all shall have “the right and 
opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives.”31 However, it is also written to ensure “the 
equal rights of men and women”; protection from “cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment”; no “arbitrary ... interference with ... privacy”; “the right 
to freedom of movement”; “freedom of opinion and expression”; “the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly”; and “the right to freedom…and association 
with others.”32 Again, the latter strictures can sometimes go against majority 
opinion, as in countries where the majority hold that individuals leaving the 
dominant religion should be punished; or where the majority, including 
women, hold that men and women are not entitled to the same rights. 
Etymological and U.N. conceptions of democracy are not exceptionally 
sophisticated, particularly as compared to ideas advanced by thinkers such as 
Dewey and hinted at by Thoreau, Tocqueville and others suggesting 
democracy is not only a manner of governing, but more fundamentally a way 
of life. Yet even these unsophisticated ideas are not especially well promoted 
in practice. Western politicians, for instance, have a long history of not being 
overly concerned about democracy in foreign countries and sometimes 
propping up brutal leaders, as in the case of past support for Fulgencio Batista, 
Augusto Pinochet and Saddam Hussein, not to mention aid to what eventually 
became the Taliban, and, as worse, numerous invasions on thin humanitarian 
pretenses. If Frankfurt School critiques are valid, moreover, then genuine 
democracy is not even really practiced in the West, for advanced industrial 
apparatus function to limit the capacity of individuals to think much less move 
beyond current realities.33 Through the mass production and marketing of 
essentially identical products, to consider a hyperbolic example, manufacturers 
can instill similar wants and desires in many and therewith common interests. 
Perhaps those wanting sports utility vehicles share an interest in the order that 
secures cheap oil through political control of regions producing it; or cheap 
steel through “free trade”; or limits wages of auto-workers by thwarting the 
formation of unions; or builds more roads and builds them bigger; or resists 
emissions laws and so on. The situation is reflected in the fact that differences 
between political parties in the United States and elsewhere are often scant 
when considered against the much larger spectrum of what is possible. Under 
such conditions, a slim number of possibilities more or less becomes the 
 
 31. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), supra note 30, at Art. 25. 
 32. G.A. Res. 217 (III), supra note 25, at Preamble, Arts. 5, 12, 13, 19, & 20. 
 33. See generally Mathew Crippen, The Totalitarianism of Therapeutic Philosophy: Reading 
Wittgenstein Through Critical Theory, 8 Essays in Philosophy 1–24 (2007); see also MAX 
HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE of REASON (Oxford Univ. Press 1947); see also HERBERT MARCUSE, 
ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES in the IDEOLOGY of ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 
(Beacon Press, 1964). 
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totality of all possibilities, and this is arguably counter to democratic 
flourishing.34 
The reasons for democratic failures not only in places such as Egypt but 
also the West are of course many and likely too complex to fully ascertain or 
even enumerate. Economic problems are involved, power hungry leaders, 
fearful citizens, religious and political ideology, cultural mores, people too 
busy surviving to look at the broader picture, along with simpler desires such 
as the wish for chocolate or coffee made cheap through exploitation or in some 
cases outright slavery. An additional reason that Western-style democracy has 
not thrived in countries such as Egypt may be that it is not, as just discussed, 
wholly successful in the West. As also mentioned, it may too be that Western 
leaders have historically been more concerned about securing perceived 
interests than human wellbeing in foreign countries—a point that will later be 
elaborated upon in the case of Egypt. Making matters worse, however, is the 
fact that popular conceptions of democracy are even shallower than the 
relatively unsophisticated ones advanced by the U.N., not to mention basic 
etymological meanings of the word. So another and very straightforward 
reason that Egypt’s brief experiment failed was that what the international 
community lauded as democracy after the January uprising of 2011 was not 
democracy in the first place. 
COLONIALISM 
Typee, a novel based on Herman Melville’s apparently sanguine 
experience of being captive in the Marquesas Islands, compares the cultures of 
Europe and the United States to that of South Pacific locals.35 Melville began 
by granting that “these shocking unprincipled wretches are cannibals.”36 He 
went on to say, however, that 
they are such only when they seek to gratify the passion of revenge upon their 
enemies; and I ask whether the mere eating of human flesh so very far exceeds 
in barbarity … [and] fiend-like skill we display in the invention of all manner 
of death-dealing engines, the vindictiveness with which we carry on our wars, 
and the misery and desolation that follow in their train... 
The term ‘Savage’ is, I conceive, often misapplied, and indeed, when I 
consider the vices, cruelties, and enormities of every kind that spring up in the 
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tainted atmosphere of a feverish civilization, I am inclined to think that so far 
as the relative wickedness of the parties is concerned, four or five Marquesan 
Islanders sent to the United States as Missionaries might be quite as useful as 
an equal number of Americans despatched to the Islands in a similar 
capacity.37 
Although not without humour, Melville was dead in earnest, and cited specific 
cases of cruelties carried out in his day—for example, torturous methods of 
execution—that in brutality exceed that of merely eating human flesh. He 
thereby pointed to misguided efforts to civilize non-Western cultures that 
occurred in his day, as in ours. By asserting that Islanders sent the United 
States might be as beneficial as missionaries in the Islands, he also suggested 
that dialogue, as opposed the morally superior attitude of “West knows best,” 
would better serve the interests of humankind.38 
The U.N., though often laudable and more responsive to human wellbeing 
than individual governments, has sometimes displayed attitudes comparable to 
that exhibited by the missionaries Melville described. Along such lines, Makau 
Mutua, while not wholly rejecting U.N. programs, suggested they are 
Eurocentric and proceed from an impulse to spread ideas that “grow out of 
Western liberalism and jurisprudence.”39 He added that although the U.N. 
agenda of promoting such values originated in attempts to counter the 
barbarism of Western governments such as the Third Reich, it is today framed 
as an effort to civilize more “primitive” regions of the world, which here 
means non-Western ones. As he bleakly summed up: “If the human rights 
movement is driven by a totalitarian or totalizing impulse, that is, a mission to 
fit a particular blueprint” on the totality of the whole, “then there is an acute 
shortage of deep reflection and a troubling abundance of zealotry in the human 
rights community.”40 
The premise that Western-style democracy represents the only morally 
permissible option is similarly problematic, for suggesting that one system is 
the totality of all acceptable systems is totalitarian, according to definitions 
offered by Frankfurt theorists such as Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse. 
As Marcuse put it, totalitarianism “is not only a terroristic political 
coordination of society, but also a non-terroristic economic-technical 
coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs by vested 
interests.”41 That is, while totalitarianism has been achieved through brutal 
regimes such as those of Hitler and Stalin, it can also be achieved by limiting 
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people’s ability to think and act beyond one social, economic or political 
arrangement. Thus if democracy is understood to be antithetical to 
totalitarianism, the premise that the former is the only acceptable system is 
self-contradictory. The wish to institute Western style governments in the 
Middle East may also represent a continuation of Modern era colonialist 
projects that began when the British, Italians and French controlled the Middle 
East, and were exercised further when the Americans and Soviets vied for 
political and economic hegemony, propping up the likes of Gamal Nasser and 
Saddam Hussein. In the case of the United States, the expansion of democracy 
is often seen and indeed lauded as an expansion of capitalism, even though the 
former does not imply the latter. At risk of sounding paranoid, this also implies 
an expansion of business opportunities and consequently American dominance. 
Western moral superiority manifests in a variety of ways, and in some 
cases seems misplaced. On a superficial level, for example, well-intentioned 
Westerners sometimes seek to liberate Middle Eastern women by changing 
their dress, rather than attending to more serious matters such as spousal rape, 
neglecting that gender-based codes of dress are culturally enforced in the West 
too. Thus “[w]hile Westerners still often see the veil as a symbol of women’s 
inferior status in the Muslim world, to Muslims, Western women’s perceived 
lack of modesty signals their degraded cultural status in the West.”42 
Interestingly, the common assumption “is that women are either covering or 
uncovering to please or obey men.”43 The wish to get others to dress more like 
Westerners is arguably symptomatic of broader, latent colonial impulses that 
still exist and are manifested in the idea that Western political systems are 
universally valid and that non-Western regions need to be saved; and to be 
sure, some regions of the world—including the Middle East—can and do 
benefit from an infusion of Western ideals in specific instances. At the same 
time, however, the reverse also holds, as I hope to soon show. 
An additional problem, as Thomas Pogge argued, relates to the position in 
which many economically disadvantaged countries were left when they gained 
independence following World War II.44 This situation has made them 
especially susceptible to foreign influence and interests.45 For example, since 
1987 the United States government has supplied roughly 1.3 billion dollars 
annually in military aid to Egypt.46 While a case can be made that this 
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sometimes serves the interests of Egyptians since the country has contended 
with various Islamic terrorist groups for decades, this has also contributed to 
the entrenchment of military rule, and terrorist actions are perhaps partly in 
response to years of military oppression. Some further point out the conscripts 
are very poorly paid and regularly used as nearly free labour in the business 
empire run by Egypt’s military elite.47 Moreover, the military aid first and 
foremost serves U.S. interests since Egypt represents a moderate force in the 
Middle East, has a treaty with Israel and plays a role in U.S. commerce, first, 
because of U.S. contractors primarily supply the military equipment, and, 
second, because 8% of global maritime shipping, not to mention dozens of 
U.S. naval vessels, pass through the Suez Canal annually.48 The history of 
Egypt, like that of the Middle East, is one of being controlled by colonial 
powers, then by competing American and Soviet and later Russian influences, 
with Egypt being subject to all of the above at different times. Such foreign 
influence would likely have been less severe had economic conditions been 
better in Egypt; and such interference makes it challenging to fulfill the ideal, 
stated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that “[a]ll 
peoples have the right of self-determination” and to “freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”49 
Other practical realities faced in the Middle East are that the majority of 
people subscribe to Islam, and exercise their religion in ways conservative by 
secular Western standards. Thus while Egyptian law treats men and women 
differently when it comes to inheritance, this different treatment is laid out in 
the Qur’an;50 the Qur’an is seen as the final, uncorrupted word of God; and 
many adherents do not see the Qur’an as discriminatory, just as many do not 
see Islamic dress codes as oppressive. As one Western female convert to Islam 
living in Egypt related to me: 
As for the inheritance, at first I also thought it was unfair. And I am a woman, 
so it would have an effect on me, but when I realized that the man is 
responsible for providing the home, for his family and providing food, clothes 
etc., and the women don’t have any responsibility for the home or family, then 
I realized the justice of the inheritance law. Of course, the wife can spend on 
her family and buy her own clothes and even food for her children, but it is not 
her obligation and any money she spends on her family is rewarded as if she 
were giving money to charity—these are her rewards. I work and spend lots of 
money on my own family, but I have never bought the food or paid bills. I tend 
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to pay for the luxuries, like holidays and clothes. A man is never allowed to 
ask his wife for a penny of her inheritance, even if he needs it. 
In addition to this, a Muslim man is potentially responsible for supporting his 
mother and sisters if husbands die, or in the event that an unmarried sister’s 
father dies. 
This is of course at odds with the United Nations’ 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, which degrees 
equal rights shall be granted,51 and a standard Western response is to say 
women holding such beliefs are indoctrinated, and to be sure, maybe they are. 
Yet it can also be asked whether Westerners are less indoctrinated. Indeed, 
without adjudicating whether Islamic tradition is just or unjust, inheritance 
practices in the West have been questioned. D. W. Haslett prominently argued 
that Western inheritance laws violate capitalist principles of equal opportunity, 
distribution according to productivity and freedom.52 At the very least, it is 
evident that wealth—especially when at the high end—bestows political 
power, so that if you are the child of a billionaire, you stand to gain power in 
ways comparable to offspring of monarchs. Moreover, from the Middle 
Eastern perspective, some widely accepted Western practices are negligent and 
borderline criminal. A case in point is the Western practice of placing elderly 
parents in care facilities rather than personally taking care of them in one’s 
home. Another that many Egyptians deem unacceptable is having adult 
children pay postsecondary tuition and giving their parents monthly rent. 
Again, my aim is not to adjudicate the extent to which these various 
practices are just or unjust, but to emphasize that many principals the U.N. 
promotes are indeed grounded in the Western liberal tradition. Though the 
U.N. emphasizes equal treatment, its documents are not directed against 
Western inheritance practices, based in the classical liberal tenet that 
individuals should be free to dispose of their property as they see fit. In 
addition to violating principles Haslett discusses and bestowing a measure of 
political power, Western inheritance conventions also allow parents to 
discriminate against daughters, sons, children who do not agree with their 
family’s religion, marry a disliked suitor and so on, so the practice is not 
necessarily any more grounded in equality than Muslim inheritance traditions. 
Regarding the human rights movement, some have also complained that it 
is a collection of contradictions,53 and in the case of U.N. documents, one does 
not need to look hard to find contrary statements. Consider again the 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 3 declares: “The 
States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the 
present Covenant.”54 However, Article 18 goes on to state: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching.55 
It then concludes with this point: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious 
and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.56 
Numerous contradictions can arise from these statements. On the one hand, 
equality between men and women is to be ensured; on the other, freedom of 
religion, which in both Western and Middle Eastern contexts often prescribes 
different roles and therefore different treatments for men and women. Both 
Western and Middle Eastern countries, like the Covenant, promote the notion 
that legal guardians should educate children as they see fit, for example, 
sending them to religious schools if they please. However, some have urged 
that this can violate rights of children. One example that comes to mind was a 
black man who called into a radio show on CBC that was debating parents’ 
rights to educate children as they see fit. He pointed out that few were 
considering the right of children to a balanced education, and how he, as 
someone who lived in the overwhelmingly white province of Newfoundland 
and Labrador, felt his already difficult situation worsened by the fact that he 
was sent to a Lutheran institution even more homogeneous than public 
schools.57 
Given the complexity of issues involved, it is perhaps appropriate that 
U.N. documents are contradictory. That is, on the one hand, the notion that we 
must be tolerant of all cultural norms is repressive and totalitarian in the sense 
that cutting off criticism leads, within a particular culture, to the establishment 
of norms that more or less become the totality of all possible arrangements; 
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and in some instances, to the continuance of practices that are, by almost any 
standard, barbaric. On the other hand, using one historical tradition to condemn 
another, for example, classical liberalism to censure Muslim cultures, 
potentially commits the same totalitarian sin. So while there is no easy way out 
of this moral and political quagmire, it would be helpful if the West took a 
more open-minded approach towards the Middle East and did less indignant 
finger wagging. 
In Plato’s dialogues, positions are advanced but gradually adjusted through 
conversation;58 and with a dialogue of this kind ongoing, one hopes that all 
cultures involved will improve themselves, or at least acquire greater tolerance 
for opposing views; and once opposing views gain a foothold in discourse, 
change for the better might ensue. This scenario is of course unlikely because 
Westerners tend to be ignorant of non-Western cultures and judgmental about 
their norms, so that the conversation is overwhelmingly one-sided. This is 
perhaps another remnant of colonialism, wherein the West once took direct 
control, and now controls through economic and ideological means, all aided 
by fairly regular military intervention. 
However, dialogue might increase non-Western receptivity to legitimate 
criticisms, for example, directed towards places where women cannot drive, 
cannot travel unchaperoned by males, are deprived of education and where 
they suffer still worse treatment that virtually all moral theories would agree 
are abuses; or countries where ceasing to be a Muslim or trying to convert 
individuals to another religion is a criminal offence, punishable by prison or in 
some cases death. This last practice obviously represses the free exercise of 
conscience on religious and indeed social matters since religion and cultural 
are intertwined in the Middle East. It is therefore disempowering and 
undemocratic. At the same time, however, a dialogue might also encourage the 
West to think more critically about its practices, for instance, its treatment of 
elderly or the fact that it too has socially enforced gender-based codes of dress 
that sometimes contribute to unhealthy standards of beauty. Such is actually 
encouraged in the literature of the United Nations Development Programme, 
which advocates “impartial space for dialogue.”59 However, insofar as it is 
directed to poorer regions, with its website hosting a labyrinth of photos 
showing almost exclusively darker skinned people dressed in colorful, 
stereotypical outfits and smiling presumably out of gratitude for Western 
succor, it arguably misses what genuine dialogue is. 
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PROSPECTS 
The fact is that democratic experiments, as measured in utilitarian terms of 
human wellbeing, have been largely unproductive in the Middle East, which 
faces political and social realities largely absent in Western countries. In 
Egypt, these realities include political assassinations using explosives, 
coordinated assaults killing scores of police officers and decades of terrorist 
attacks on civilians. It might be added that militant, violent Islam is a minority 
position in Egypt.60 Yet it has inordinate sway because militants are well 
funded and armed, and in some cases preaching to poorly educated 
populations, and also, as will be discussed, because Islamists have learned to 
be conspiratorial in response to years of oppression. The situation is more 
extreme in countries such as Iraq and Libya where conditions are arguably 
much worse than when ruled by their former repellant dictators. While it is 
simplistic to therefore conclude that despotic military regimes are the solution, 
it is equally misguided to conclude that political solutions that have worked 
tolerably well in the West will inevitably work in the Middle East given the 
disparity of situations. 
In an article titled, “Why Western Democracy Can Never Work in the 
Middle East,” Andrew Green, former British Ambassador to Syria and Saudi 
Arabia, observed: 
Democracy is empathically not the solution for extremely complex societies 
and Western meddling only makes matters immeasurably worse. The 
fundamental reason for our failure is that democracy, as we understand it, 
simply doesn’t work in Middle Eastern countries where family, tribe, sect and 
personal friendships trump the apparatus of the state. These are certainly not 
societies governed by the rule of law. On the contrary, they are better 
described as “favour for favour” societies. When you have a problem of any 
kind, you look for someone related to you by family, tribe or region to help 
you out and requests are most unlikely to be refused since these ties are 
especially powerful. In countries where there is no effective social security, 
your future security lies only in the often extensive family.61 
Other articles repeat this pessimism,62 and even when more optimistic, cite 
similar obstacles. 
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Writing on Egypt, Lisa Anderson, Middle East expert and former President 
of the American University in Cairo, remarked that “[e]verything in Egypt—
from obtaining a driver’s license to getting an education—is formally very 
cheap but in practice very expensive.” It is so because “most transactions, 
official and unofficial, are accompanied by off-the-books payments.”63 In the 
experience of my ex-students, a number of whom got driver’s licenses without 
knowing how to drive because their father knew someone or in one instance 
gave an official fish; and in my own case, where I was unexpectedly exempted 
from a portion of the test involving reading signs because I had a 
representative from the esteemed American University in Cairo with me and 
possibly also because I am white, which often ensures ease of treatment in 
Egypt, this rings true. Elaborating on the situation in Libya, which in some 
regards mirrors that of Egypt, Anderson went on to explain that decades of 
international isolation and neglect of infrastructure have left “the generation in 
its 30s and 40s—the one likely to assume leadership in a new Libya—poorly 
educated and ill equipped to manage the country.”64 Perhaps more seriously, 
after years of deeply oppressive rule, “Libyans’ trust in their government, and 
in one another, eroded, and they took refuge in the solace of tribe and family.” 
Accordingly, “Libyan society has been fractured, and every national 
institution, including the military, is divided by the cleavages of kinship and 
region.”65 
Arwa al-Magariaf, former Libyan refugee and daughter of the first post-
Gadhafi president, who visited Libya for the first time in 32 years in 2011, 
repeated similar sentiments when I interviewed her. Aside from incredibly 
poor infrastructure and educational resources, she heartbrokenly lamented that 
the Libyan culture she used to know, by in large, no longer exists; that the 
roughly four decades of Gaddafi rule robbed people of their spirit and 
promoted self-serving, shallow, suspicious and malicious attitudes; and that 
she—once among the most unflaggingly optimistic individuals when it came to 
Libya—has relinquished hope and no longer even wishes to identify as Libyan. 
She explained that observing neighbors being beaten, dragged through the 
street and hanged, and fearing to intervene and consequently doing nothing to 
prevent the cruelty, convinces witnesses that they themselves are evil. 
Believing this and also seeing others failing to act, people soon thereafter come 
to see others in their society as evil too. Deprivations leading people in the 
community to plunder the home of the victim exacerbates this feeling, as does 
the practical necessity of accepting paltry handouts from the government. 
Other practices diminish individuality, for example, that the Gadhafi 
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government made large batches of similar clothing available at given times, so 
that many women would wear essentially identical dresses; or that soccer 
players were only referred to as numbers until one of Gadhafi’s sons took up 
the sport; or that women learned to escape deplorable poverty by giving their 
bodies to Gadhafi loyalists. As Dewey reasoned, “democracy as a way of life is 
controlled by personal faith in personal day-by-day working together with 
others,”66 and this faith was largely eradicated under the conditions described 
by al-Magariaf, which eroded civic mindedness and personal empowerment, 
along with a sense of personal worth and confidence in the value of others. 
All this points to a potential error in Green’s earlier described assessment, 
and also to possible hope, albeit not in the immediate future. To re-quote, 
Green conjectured “that democracy, as we understand it, simply doesn’t work 
in Middle Eastern countries where family, tribe, sect and personal friendships 
trump the apparatus of the state.”67 However, perhaps rather than being a 
primary cause of failures, the arrangement instead follows from longstanding 
oppression, first, by colonial rulers, then military governments, often supported 
by the West. That is, while the Middle East emphasizes family and tribal 
connections, this is not inevitably counterproductive. It may be the insular, 
mistrusting nature currently present has been exacerbated by the fact that 
governments cannot be trusted; that individuals and their loved ones might be 
taken by police at any time or attacked by thugs; and that one therefore learns 
to rely on connections and personal favors. This also offers hints as to why 
Morsi and the Brotherhood, though popularly elected, flouted democracy, 
namely, because Islamists in Egypt “have been schooled by decades of 
repression” and “their movement survived only after being conspiratorial and 
organized.”68 
Under such circumstances, it is difficult to live a democratic life and by 
extension to establish democratic governments, an argument Dewey, 
sometimes known as “the philosopher of democracy,” made in a piece penned 
late in life. Passages from this work—“Creative Democracy – The Task Before 
Us”—are worth quoting at length. Dewey noted, to begin with, that it is a 
commonplace that democracy is a way of life; yet we often act as if it mainly 
occurs in state capitals or when populations go to polls. Dewey insisted this 
narrow understanding is only escaped by realizing “in thought and act that 
democracy is a personal way of individual life.”69 More specifically, we need 
to stop seeing “our own dispositions and habits as accommodated to certain 
institutions” and “to learn to think of the latter as expressions, projections and 
 
 66. JOHN DEWEY, Creative Democracy – The Task Before Us, in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE 
LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, 1939–1941, 224, 228 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 2008) 
 67. Green, supra note 61. 
 68. The Arab Spring, supra note 6, at 11. 
 69. DEWEY, supra note 66, at 226. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
300 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:281 
extensions of habitually dominant personal attitudes.”70 Dewey allowed that 
this is nothing fundamentally new. However, “when applied it puts a new 
practical meaning in old ideas,” for “it signifies that powerful present enemies 
of democracy can be successfully met only by the creation of personal attitudes 
in individual human beings[.]”71 Dewey accordingly held that civic statutes, 
military intervention and the like do little to protect democracy if “separated 
from individual attitudes so deep-seated as to constitute personal character.”72 
As importantly, Dewey urged that democracy, as a way of life, demands 
faith “in the possibilities of human nature” and in common people irrespective 
of race, religion, gender, class and other discriminations.73 Enshrining such 
ideas in statutes is worthwhile, but “it is only on paper unless it is put in force 
in the attitudes which human beings display to one another in all the incidents 
and relations of daily life.”74 Thus attacking this or that authoritarian regime 
for intolerance and cruelty is insincere, for example, if we discriminate which 
refugees will be accepted on the basis of whether or not they are Muslim, as 
some prominent politicians currently advocate; or more broadly, if we are 
motivated “by anything save a generous belief in their possibilities as human 
beings, a belief which brings with it the need for providing conditions which 
will enable these capacities to reach fulfillment”;75 and faith, moreover, “in the 
capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment and action if proper 
conditions are furnished.”76 
While allowing that many will see this vision as utopian; and without 
suggesting that it has been fully achieved, which is impossible from Dewey’s 
standpoint since democracy is always an ongoing process, Dewey stressed that 
he did not invent this faith, but gained it inasmuch as it energized his 
surroundings. He wrote: 
When I think of the conditions under which men and women are living in 
many foreign countries today, fear of espionage, with danger hanging over the 
meeting of friends for friendly conversation in private gatherings, I am inclined 
to believe that the heart and final guarantee of democracy is in free gatherings 
of neighbors on the street corner to discuss back and forth what is read in 
uncensored news of the day, and in gatherings of friends in the living rooms of 
houses and apartments to converse freely with one another.77 
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It is precisely this that al-Magariaf said is lacking in Libya. It also seems to be 
evaporating in Egypt and other places. 
It has been said “[p]laces designed with distrust [often] get what they [are] 
looking for,”78 as when high fences and razor wire chase people away, creating 
a vacuum for questionable activities that occur away from prying eyes. 
Something comparable applies to social relations, as William James cogently 
argued. He noted that strength of a belief is measured by willingness to act on 
it;79 acting on a belief generates consequences that sometimes verify it; and 
accordingly “our faith beforehand in an uncertified result” can be “the only 
thing that makes the result come true.”80 James illustrated in the following 
way. When first we make someone’s acquaintance, we can mistrust until the 
person demonstrates his or her worth; or we can trust until such a time—if it 
ever comes—that evidence shows the person is untrustworthy.81 In both cases 
we initially act without evidence, meaning we take a small leap of faith, and in 
both cases this increases the chances of verifying the stance we initially took 
on faith. This is so because if we act on the assumption that people are 
untrustworthy, and accordingly do not smile, talk coldly, remain standing when 
they enter our office so that they do not sit down, they are more likely to return 
our frosty behavior and therefore appear unfriendly. If, by contrast, we are 
hospitable, they are more likely to respond in kind. The choice, then, is not 
between faith and non-faith, but between two varieties of faith: one 
engendering failure, the other success. James urged that a kind of faith that 
would prevent us from realizing certain desired ends is irrational.82 Based on 
such reasoning Dewey similarly advocated an optimistic faith in his writings 
on democracy. 
Optimism and hope of course do not conquer all, but when combined with 
perseverance and goodwill they have contributed to remarkable things, as in 
movements led by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Mistrust, on the 
other hand, has long impeded democracy, as in the McCarthy era, for example. 
A prevalent source today is fear arising from Islamic terrorism, and I am 
ashamed to say I sometimes feel it too. Yet the dangers of mistrust are 
apparent. Libya represents an extreme case, and Egypt, though unlikely to 
degrade to that state in the foreseeable future because initial conditions are 
better and people there possess strong national identity, is moving in that 
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direction. National identity is of course a two-edged sword. It can create trust 
and unity, but equally mistrust and fear of the other. Increasingly this is the 
case in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood is branded a terrorist group, 
arguably unjustly, and identifying people with that name is a pretext for attack, 
as in the case of the former Libyan Ambassador and the earlier mentioned 
reporter and researcher Ismail Alexandrani. Affairs are much the same, albeit 
in lesser degree, in the West where many applaud Donald Trump for openly 
racist comments against Mexicans, or for declaring that state officials should 
keep Muslims out, and where political leaders too many to enumerate have 
advocated the same.83 
Though not so starry-eyed to propose we blindly trust everyone, admit 
refugees and immigrants with no background checks and so on, mistrust has 
ruined Libya, oppressed Egypt and is breeding fear in the West. In so doing, it 
is arguably promoting conditions that cultivate the very things that are feared, 
along with tendencies antithetical to democracy: oppression, suspicion, 
exclusion, discrimination, scapegoating and hatred on the basis of ethnicity and 
religion, therewith increasingly insular, disaffected and alienated social 
arrangements. Certainly it has undermined the faith that Dewey held necessary 
for democratic flourishing in the Middle East, and there is a danger that the 
same thing is occurring in the West. Yet this also suggests a hope for bringing 
about a better world, namely, avoiding paranoid mistrust and thereby restoring 
conditions under which democratic faith can flourish. 
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